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WORLD POPULATION: AN UNWISHFUL
ASSESSMENT, A HOPEFUL PROPOSAL
William G. Hollingsworth *
Unfortunately, few political leaders appreciate the urgency of
the population problem, because they are not aware of the enormous momentum built into current population growth rates.
This momentum is particularly ominous in developing countries
as a result of the tremendous increases in the numbers of people
entering the childbearing years. For example, a developing
country that has a 3 percent population growth rate and wishes
to have its population level off at double its present numbers
must reduce its average family size from over four children per
family to slightly over two children per family in steady stages
within the next ten years. If it waits twenty years before starting
such a ten-year program to reduce family size, its population will
grow to nearly four times its present numbers.
-Richard N. Gardner (emphasis his)**
"Hell is truth seen too late."
-Thomas Hobbes

I.

INTRODUCTION

Present world population of over 4.5 billion appears to be growing
at an annual rate of about 1.8 percent. 1 Should humankind continue
to grow at this seemingly low rate, the number of human beings

• Copyright © 1983 by William G. Hollingsworth, Professor of Law, University of Tulsa
College of Law.
•• Gardner, A World Action Plan to Limit Population Growth, SATURDAY REVIEW/WORLD,
July 27, 1974, at 11, 47.
1. M. KENT, 1983 WORLD POPULATION DATA SHEET OF THE POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU,
INC. (1983) [hereinafter cited as 1983 DATA SHEET].
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would double every thirty-nine years. 2 This would mean-but, of
course, does not assure-a human population of about nine billion by
the year 2020.
To look only at worldwide figures, however, obscures the wellknown reality that present population growth is concentrated in the
world's most economically distressed regions. Based on data from
the late 1970's, much of Asia is experiencing annual growth rates
above 2 percent, which represents a population doubling time of less
than thirty-five years.3 Latin America's population is growing at 2.3
percent per year, a popUlation doubling time of thirty years;' Africa
is growing at a 3 percent annual rate, a population doubling time of
twenty-three years. 6 If a nation's population continues to grow at an
annual rate of 3 percent-a growth rate that many nations today
either approach, equal, or even exceed-the resulting population increase in a century will be nineteenfold. 6 Even a one percent annual
rate, well below the world's 1.8 percent growth rate, would yield a
270 percent population increase in 100 years. 7
Juxtaposed with the foregoing data is the doctrine-or the
myth-of absolute national sovereignty. One by-product of the absolutizing of national sovereignty is the assumption that each nation
is ethically free to decide against limiting its population growth. Indeed, a large and growing population historically has been viewed as
a signpost of national success and an essential element of national
power. Nonetheless, contemporary awareness of the massive
tragedy invited by uncontrolled population growth mandates an immediate reevaluation of the view that each nation is free to grow
without limits. In response to this sometimes feeble but inereasing
awareness, this article will consider the need for and prescribe a
population limitation ethical imperative for the world's nations. The
article will attempt an ethical inquiry into and offer recommenda-

2. Id. One, of course, does not expect the world's population growth rate to remain forever
constant.
3. See id.
4.Id.
5.Id.
6. L. BROWN, IN THE HUMAN INTEREST 22 (1974).
7. Id. Due to the combination of high birth rates and rural-to-urban migration, many Third
World cities will experience growth in excess of 3% in the decades just ahead. Many will triple
in size over the next twenty-five years. If present trends continue, the population of Cairo will
exceed 15 million, and Sao Paulo will exceed 25 million, by the end of this century. Mexico City
will have to accommodate-somehow-over 30 million persons. See Beir, Can Third World
Cities Cope?, Population Bulletin, XXXI, No.4, at 8-9 (Dec. 1976). In these and other already
poverty-laden cities, the outlook for human dignity and freedom is grim.
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tions as to the population goals of nations. The obviously vital but
generally secondary questions of means, both international and intranational, must be dealt with elsewhere.

II.

OBSTACLES TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEM

A. Our Biases
Our predilections against "zero population growth" (ZPG)8 are of a
primordial, instinctual nature. Despite the severe stresses already
being caused by increasing population, the wish to discourage population growth still somehow seems inhospitable, ungenerous, unmagnanimous, anti-humanitarian, and sinister. Likewise, the ethical
problems involved in attempting to achieve worldwide ZPG are capable of tormenting any morally sensitive soul. Thus, for highly personal, highly emotional, and often morally important reasons, most if
not all people most desperately would like to believe that the call for
a serious global effort toward population stability is a false and
neglectable imperative. After all, how many persons with any claim
to social virtue want to risk sullying their own possibly fragile moral
self-image or reputation? Accordingly, some polemicists have
depicted ZPG, indeed have depicted the entire ecology movement, as
the modern elitist equivalent of keeping the king's hunting preserves
untrampled by the common folk. With equally tragic misguidance,
others have condemned the idea of worldwide ZPG as neo-colonialism, neo-racism, even as racial genocide-a set of judgments in
perfect conflict with the well-being and the survival of the very
peoples the judgers are purporting to protect. Still others have
played off the idea of striving for a stabilized world population
against the idea of transforming the affluent nations' highconsumption, high-pollution economic behavior, as if humanity is apt
to have the luxury of choosing only one of the two remedies.
By far the worthiest personal, emotional, and moral impetus
against a social commitment to a nongrowth rate of human reproduction is simply the justifiably extremely high valuation that any caring person places upon every individual human being and upon the
sacred vocation of parenthood. Yet, never has so authentic a pair of
moral valuations sired so inauthentic and anti-humane an ideology of
absolute laissez faire. Like all ideologies positing absolute in-

8. "Zero population growth" (ZPG) is an often used synonym for population stability, i.e., no
numerical growth.
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dividualism, the doctrine that deciding how many children to have is
a purely private matter ignores basic social facts. The reality is that
in deciding to conceive fewer children than they biologically
could-which describes the behavior of almost all couples in almost
all societies-individual couples do indeed limit the creation of other
infinitely valuable individuals. All such individual decisions are likely
to be influenced socially to some nontrivial extent. Nonetheless, a
socially explicit decision to discourage other people from having as
many children as they otherwise might have wanted seems to offend
virtually every liberal, libertarian, and Judiac-Christian value.

B. Our Fallacies
For the foregoing and other reasons, some sublime, some not so
sublime, numerous thoughtful and not-so-thoughtful souls have succumbed to an epidemic of self-deceptive wishful thinking. Minds
capable of far better thinking have accepted or espoused fallacious
and unrealistic arguments to avoid confronting the admittedly
soulrending moral imperative of global population limits.
Perhaps the most simplistic fallacy concerning population is to
view the matter purely as a problem of physical space. Generally, the
argument runs thusly: "If we ever run out of places to put people on
the earth's land, we can always build floating cities on the sea or
[currently more popular] orbit them around the earth and/or eolonize
the moon and other nearby·celestial pieces of real estate." Unfortunately, such "solutions" utterly fail to grasp the nature of the problem. The problem of population limits consists of the relationship between numbers of people and the supply of all the resources necessary to sustain persons in a state of at least minimal well-being. In
this light, to say that we have or expect to have one, some, or even
most of the necessary resources will not do. The lack of anyone essential resource is the sufficient condition for massive tragedy.
Whatever the concern at issue, the wishful thinkers profess an absolute religious faith in the power 'of technology to supply every need
or to solve every problem, at least in the long run. 9 As to the food
9. See generally J. SIMON, THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE (1981). In this work human ingenuity
acquires the infinite creative power of a super deity: it has the potential to service however
many people there ever are by creating all the appropriate resources needed forever (except
during "temporary shortages"). See id. at 345-48. Although Simon's book is replete with
graphs and charts, his data fail utterly to support his leap of technological faith. An important
reason for the failure is the fallacy of blindly assuming that a world ecosystem attempting to
support anywhere from 7 to 9 billion people or more as well as all their industries will function
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needs of increased billions, it has been confidently denied that the
supply of land or of any other natural resource will constrain the
world's food supply for "the foreseeable future."10 Essentially, there
are only two ways to increase food production. One is by increasing
per-acre yield; the other is to increase the total acreage devoted to
food production. The development of synthetic food materials and
the exploitation of alternative resources such as ocean harvesting do
not alter the primacy of these two approaches; rather they are incorporated in the two approaches.
With regard to the first approach, increasing the per-acre yield,
Worldwatch Institute's Lester Brown has reported that food production increases in the last three decades have "entailed land abuse so
severe that fully one-fifth and perhaps as much as one-third of the
world's cropland is losing topsoil at a rate that is undermining its
long-term productivity."ll In addition, should anything like today's
population growth rate continue much longer, achieving the required
increases in per-acre yield is apt to necessitate massive increases in
the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, a prospect that threatens the planet's biological processes. 12 These are not the only
dangers. As University of California at Berkeley Professor John
Holdren has warned, increasing food production to meet population
demands could require the further curtailment of what little agricultural diversity exists. Such an agricultural system would plant only
the very highest yield crop strains, thus sacrificing humanity's hedge
against general crop failure from pests, disease, unforseen weather
conditions, and other naturally occurring problems. IS Hence, the
strategy to increase food production could itself cause massive
famine. This remains so with or without the utilization of "synthetic
food factories."
No matter what crops are planted, world agricultural production is
subject to sudden and drastic reduction due to major global climatic
with the same efficiency and effectiveness as did a world ecosystem supporting 2 to 4 billion
people and their industries. This is like saying to a blindfolded runner in canyon country,
"Keep on going at full speed. You haven't fallen off a cliff yet." For other criticisms, see
REVIEW SYMPOSIUM, POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW, VIII, No.1, at 163-77 (Mar.
1982).
10. J. SIMON, supra note 9, at 68.
11. L. BROWN, BmLDING A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 5 (1981).
12. Concerning fertilizer, see Borgstrom, Never Before Has Humankind Had To Face the
Problem of Feeding So Many People With So Little Food, SMITHSONlAN, VII, No.4, at 71, 76
(July 1976).
13. See Holdren, Population and the American Predicament: The Case Against Ccrmplacency, DAEDALUS, CII, No.4, at 31, 40 & n.18, 43 (Fall 1973).

858

ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS

[Vol. 10:853

changes, changes that have been the norm rather than the exception
in human and pre-human history. As a result, continuing population
growth at rates that will effectively preclude the achievement of a
substantial agricultural margin of safety is a virtual guarantee of
macrocosmic famine sooner or later.14
The only other way to increase food production-and we will certainly have to employ both ways-is to increase the total acreage
devoted to agriculture. As Michigan State Professor Georg Borgstrom has noted, "The awareness of what it takes in land, water, and
storage to feed each person has, by and large, been dissipated in the
euphoria of alleged technical and economic miracles."l5 The enlarge-

14. It has been suggested that some margin of safety now exists in the considerable potential for redistributing the present level of agricultural production. Of principal importance, affluent nations could curtail the extremely wasteful use of plant protein involved in those nations' excessive meat production and consumption. Thus, a significant portion of present
livestock feed production acreage and grazing lands could be used to produce grains and other
plant foods for direct human consumption worldwide. Although one can scarcely imagine a
more difficult undertaking politically and administratively, such a redistribution ought to be
attempted. Unfortunately, however, any plausibly imaginable degree of success is not apt to
do more than reduce much existing undernutrition-hardly an insignificant feat. But even if
present needs could be nearly or barely met with existing output, that victory would provide
no margin of safety against a major setback in agricultural production. Much less would mere
redistribution suffice with continuing increases in population.
15. Borgstrom, supra note 12, at 74. I haven't forgotten the sea with its "threedimensional" acreage. Nonetheless, Jacques Cousteau suspects there may have been a 30 percent decline in the intensity of marine life in the last 20 years. The likeliest causes are man's
overexploitation and pollution. Worldwatch Institute's Lester Brown notes that, despite
enormously increased and technologically sophisticated investment in fishing fleets and fish
farming, the world's fish catch has leveled off since 1970, with the annual fish supply per person falling by 13%. L. BROWN, RESOURCE TRENDS AND POPULATION POLICY: A TIME FOR
REASSESSMENT, WORLDWATCH PAPER 29, at 8 (May 1979) [hereinafter cited as L. BROWN,
RESOURCE TRENDS]. As for the highly uncertain potential from massive sea farming and the
like, one must hope, pray, beg, and implore that man will tread extremely softly and assess
with great care the possible consequences of any further major disruption of the world's gravely jeopardized underwater biology and chemistry. There is nothing at stake except an
indispensable link in the planet's life chain and the primordial source of all earthly life.
[W]ater, as the universal solvent, is easier to pollute than soil; physical and chemical
contamination of bodies of water have detrimental or lethal effects on acquatic
organisms or their consumers and are much more difficult to prevent or control than
is the case for expanses of land. Also, aquaculture organisms tend to concentrate
pollutants. Pollution is often heaviest in some of the places where ocean-based
aquaculture would thrive best. Aquaculture is limited to regions with enough water in
the desired form (temperature, salinity, etc.) for a specific crop. Costs for large scale
industrial production of aquaculture tend to make the product available only as high
price luxury food; pumps, tanks, feed and labor costs are high. Fish disease is difficult
to control because of the water medium and crowded conditions.
M. GABEL HO-PING: FOOD FOR EVERYONE, 161 (1979) (omitting his numerical listing format).
Even so, "[a]quaculture has very high productivity in many situations." ld.
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ment of agricultural land acreage is already causing extremely
serious problems. Writes Professor Borgstrom:
In the course of Man's quest for food more than half the world's
forest cover has vanished, large areas of grassland have been
plowed, and major groundwater reserves irreversibly drawn
down. China and India ... have both paid a very high ecological
price for their millions. Forest and pasturelands have been
squeezed down to wholly inadequate levels. Erosion, desertification, waterlogging and salination have destroyed much tilled
land and are jeopardizing still more. Irrigation reservoirs are
filling with silt at ten times the anticipated rate. 16
The needs of a surging world population will require that more and
more land be cleared and otherwise altered for both agricultural and
non-agricultural uses. In the words of Rene Dubos:
man will have to eliminate all forms of wildlife that would compete with him for space and for food; . . . he will tolerate wild
landscapes only to the extent that they serve his needs . . . .
Man will thus destroy all the aspects of the environment under
which he evolved as a species and which have created his present
biological beingY
The costs and risks inherent in substantially increased environmental destruction are much more than a matter of elitist aesthetics.
Concerning the costs, Erik Eckholm writes as follows:
Since the impending large-scale loss of species is without precedent and involves the disruption of ecological systems whose
complexity is beyond human grasp, no means exist for quantifying the costs. . . . Some species of proven economic value are
under acute pressure, but perhaps the greatest social costs of
species destruction will stem from future opportunities unknowingly lost. [For example, o]nly a small fraction of the earth's
plant species have been screened for medically useful ingredients. 18
Mihajlo Mesarovic and Eduard Pestel had earlier attempted to suggest the awesome risks, as they stated:
Today we understand much better than our ancestors that the
existence of all life on Earth-our own included-depends on the
stability of the ecological system. An Earth with less diverse inhabitants might not continue to possess the stability essential
16. Borgstrom, supra note 12, at 74.
17. Dubos, Second Edition: Does Man Have A Future, THE CENTER MAGAZINE, No.2, at 57,
58 (1971).
18. E. ECKHOLM, DISAPPEARING SPECIES: THE SOCIAL CHALLENGE, WORLDWATCH PAPER 22,
at 12, 15 (July 1978).
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for adaptation and survival. And if our ecosystem breaks
down-even if only temporarily-the effect on mankind will be
calamitous. The ultimate irony confronting technological man
may well reside in the fact that Nature's most potent threats to
human welfare are not her destructive power-earthquakes, tornadoes and hurricanes-but the fragility of the web of life, the
delicacy of those skeins which bind species to species and which
comprise the dynamic bonds which relate the animate and inanimate realms so inextricably in the process of life. 19

One should also understand that the demands of a growing world
population go well beyond the individual's need for food and standing-sitting-sleeping space. We must reject in toto the following particularly fallacious argument. The argument asserts that there·is no
reason to be very concerned about high population growth rates in
the so-called "Third World" because the peoples of those nations use
so little energy and other resources and cause such little pollution.
Surely one cannot accept ethically the unstated assumption of this
argument: that hundreds of millions of present and future Asians,
Mricans, and Latin Americans cl:).tl and should be expected to spend
the rest of their lives on a bare subsistence diet crowded beside some
barren hovel while ensuing generations of North Americans and Europeans in the so-called "first two worlds" continue to watch their
television sets and go for Sunday drives. Here indeed is a neo-colonialist and genuinely racist approach to population policy. 20

III.

TOWARD A CARING REALISM: THE BASIC PROPOSAL

Both minimal justice and political reality require us to ask a very
tough question. How, in fact, would humankind be able to produce
and, where necessary, transport enough heat, shelter, clothing,
19. M. MESAROVIC & E. PESTEL, MANKIND AT THE TuRNING POINT 13 (1974).
20. Besides its ethical unacceptability, the approach is factually false even as to the problem
of satisfying people's basic needs:
Villagers in the poor countries where firewood is used for cooking are decimating
local forests. The average villager requires between one and two tons of firewood
each year, and expanding village populations are raising firewood demands so fast
that the regenerative capacities of many forests are being surpassed. . .. Under the
population onslaught, forests recede farther and farther from the villages until entire
regions and countries are eventually deforested.
L. BROWN, THE TwENTY·NINTH DAY 23 (1978).
Happily, Third World governments are becoming increasingly aware of the threat that con·
tinued substantial population growth poses to their nations' well·being. See, e.g., N.Y. Times,
Nov. 2, 1981, SA, at 13, col. 1 ("Legislators from 19 Asian countries have concluded a United
Nations-sponsored conference on population problems by proposing that their governments
work to hold Asia's annual population growth rate to 1 percent by the end of the century").
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water and sanitation systems, medicine, hospitals, fertilizer, farm
machinery, farm produce, education, communication, and other
goods and services to meet at least the basic needs and most minimal
amenities of eight, ten, twelve, or fourteen billion people without
wreaking massive life-destroying havoc on the planet's already beleaguered environment? Even the congenital hyperoptimist must admit that there is a substantial chance that, even with the most earnest effort plausibly imaginable, humanity would not be able to devise
and carry out humanely a feasible answer in time. 21 Professor Holdren warns of civilization's growing interference in the planet's "biological processes that provide us with services we do not know how
to replace."22 His words deserve careful persual, as he states:
The cycling of essential plant nutrients such as nitrogen,
phosphorus, and sulfur is contingent at various stages on biological processes, and these same cycles play an important role in
the disposal of civilization's wastes. The environmental concentrations of ammonia, carbon monoxide, and hydrogen sulfide-all poisonous-are biologically controlled. These 'public
service' functions of the biological environment cannot be
replaced by technology now or in the next century. . . .
The specific mechanisms by which civilization's activities are
disrupting the performance of indispensable natural services
. . . include selective poisoning of vulnerable organisms and the
corresponding disruption of terrestrial and oceanic food webs,
alteration of chemical balances in the environment, overexploitation of commercial species, and the destruction of natural communities serving as ecological buffers and reservoirs of species
diversity . . . .
. . . [M]ankind is systematically diminishing the capacity of the
environment to perform its essential functions of pest control,
nutrient cycling, waste management, and climate regulation, at
the same time that growing population and rising consumption
per person are creating even larger demands for these services.
Evidently, the inadequacy of present scientific knowledge to
predict the time and character of the ultimate breakdown in this
process is often taken to be grounds for complacency, but our ignorance here should be alarming, not reassuring.2S
So, like Noah, we are adequately forewarned. There is indeed a
considerable and awesome risk that humanity could not humanely

21. One must also admit that the attempt to cope with the needs and wants of increased
billions of persons may well entail substantial losses of personal freedom, whether or not that
attempt is successful. See generally Dubos, B'Upra note 17.
22. Holdren, B'Upra note 13, at 33.
23. [d. at 34.
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provide for itself at a population anywhere close to double the 4.5
billion figure of 1981 without seriously damaging the planet's poorly
understood chemical-climatic-microorganismic support base for complex life. It is because of this stated risk and for related earth-andpeople-caring reasons that the human race should at the very least
commit itself to a general population goal. That goal should be to attain as soon as is possible and to maintain for the foreseeable future a
level or successive levels of reproduction in every nation no greater
than what is needed for that nation's sustained population stability.
This latter level of reproduction is what demographers call "the
population replacement fertility rate" or, more simply, "replacement fertility."
Due to nations' differences in population mortality rates, the fertility needed for continuous population replacement varies by nation
from about 2.1 to about 2.5 children per woman in her lifetime. 24
Currently, replacement fertility rate for the United States means
that women would bear an average of 2.1 children in their respective
lifetimes. 26 Obviously, prescribing any such maximum societal average for a nation does not necessarily mean prescribing a maximum
for the individual person. 26 It does require, however, broad social
planning regarding population. A nation expecting any significant
amount of net immigration should strive not to exceed a fertility rate
that is slightly below replacement rate-so as to offset fully the additional childbearing caused by expected net immigration. 27 Any such
24. 1983 DATA SHEET, supra note 1, at n.8. As of 1980 about 30 nations, among them the
United States, had a fertility rate at or below replacement level. See L. BROWN, BUILDING A
SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 151 (1981). Although the total number of such nations now appears to
be above 30, there are still more such nations in Europe than in the entire rest of the world. See
1983 DATA SHEET, supra note 1.
Demographers frequently use the "total fertility rate" (TFR) in attempting to describe a nation's fertility. The TFR "indicates the average number of children that would be born to each
woman in a population if each were to live through her childbearing lifetime (usually considered ages 15-49) bearing children at the same rate as women of those ages actually did in a
given year." Id. at n.8.
25. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, Series P-25, No. 802,
ESTIMATES OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND COMPONENTS OF CHANGE: 1940 TO
1978 at 2 (May 1979).
26. Throughout this article the term "fertility" refers solely to births per woman and not to
any individual's capacity for reproduction.
27. A nation's downward adjustment of its overall fertility rate goal to offset the added
childbearing resulting from future net immigration is sound policy: were net immigration to
continue indefinitely and the nation's overall fertility rate to remain at unadjusted replacement, its population theoretically would never stop increasing. Although I won't continue mentioning it, the foregoing adjustment is contemplated whenever this article advocates replacement fertility as a societal maximum.
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proposal must be examined not only in its mathematical aspects, but
in the perspective of an overall concern for human life and the environment.
A. Goal Assessment and Later Goal Modification
This section will assess the reasonableness of the general fertility
limitation goal proposed in the previous section, and it will also suggest the probable later need for further goal modification in at least
some nations. In assessing the reasonableness of replacement fertility as a proposed fertility ceiling for the world's nations, one must
again consider the awesome risk of massive ecological harm. What
are the mathematical chances that such harm will actually occur?
Man's present state of combined knowledge and ignorance surely requires that the probabilities for massive catastrophe be regarded as
substantial. In addition, we can believe reasonably that the larger
the world's population has grown by a given date the greater the
Assuming legal net immigration into the United States of 400,000 persons per year, and
assuming that the problem of illegal immigration can and will be fairly and humanely brought
under effective control, to stay at or below "immigration-adjusted replacement" fertility in
the United States would likely require that henceforth fertility rates average no more than
about 1.98 children per wOUlan. See Coale, Alternative Paths to a Stationary Population, in
COMM'N ON POPULATION GROWTH AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE, RESEARCH REPORTS VOL. I,
DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF POPULATION GROWTH 598 (1972). Coale's fertility figure
for long-term ZPG with 400,000 annual net immigration is 1.97, but it assumes a perpetual
2.11 fertility rate in the foreign-born population. My figure of 1.98, approximately long-term
ZPG fertility for both domestic- and foreign-born American women considered together is
simply the average between the 1.97 and 2.11 figures, weighted according to the projected
ultimately stabilized relative size of the two groups of persons under the 400,000 annual immigration assumption. Thanks to those women who will bear no children or have only one child
in their lifetime, a 1.98 fertility rate does not preclude any woman who wants two children
from having them. Nor, for the same reason, is it inconsistent with nature's full dose of multiple births and with some couples' planning for more than two children. This is hardly surprising, for the total fertility rate in the United States currently is reported to be about 1.8. 1983
DATA SHEET, supra note 1. Some demographers, however, suspect that lifetime fertility rates
among women in the United States currently of childbearing age will prove to be higher.
At this writing, regular immigration, refugee admissions, and illegal immigration are combining to yield an annual United States net immigration substantially in excess of 400,000 persons. A highly persuasive moral case can be made for the proposition that total annual net immigration henceforth should not be allowed to average more than the foregoing figure. Indeed,
we should seriously consider seeking an annual total immigration rate substantially below
400,000. In the United States alone, the resources spent to service the needs of and to create
jobs for a large number of immigrants each year could do immensely greater humanitarian
good if applied for the next few decades to critically needed international aid that would help
hundreds of millions, even billions, of persons. For an excellent, concise analysis of contemporary and future immigration policy ethics, see John Tanton, International Migration and
World Stability in ALTERNATIVES TO GROWTH-I: A SEARCH FOR SUSTAINABLE FUTURES 243-64
(D. Meadows ed. 1977).
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chance for massive catastrophe in attempting to provide for that
population. Beyond these two truisms, any quantifications of the
risks are nothing but guesses. Nevertheless, we are morally required
to guess.
Pretending no expertise, my guess is as follows. If, by continuing
present growth rates, humankind reaches a population of over eight
billion by the year 2020, less than forty years hence, there is at least
a 50 percent chance that millions of human beings will die cruel and
untimely deaths as a result of one or a combination of the following
scenarios. First, the attempt to meet at least the material needs and
minimal material wants of vastly increased numbers of people simply
may prove woefully inadequate. Second, that heroic attempt,
although superficially more or less successful, eventually may result
in greatly increased environmental and ecological havoc causing
greater mortality.2s In fact, a human population growing fast
enough to reach or surpass the eight billion mark by 2020, due to the
increased numbers of young people, most probably would continue
growing rapidly and enormously in the several decades after 2020
unless the growth were tragically ended by catastrophic mortality.
Therefore, under the foregoing hypothetical, the chance of a
massively tragic outcome by, say, 2060 is apt to be substantially
higher than 50 percent.
Even if the probability of tragedy is far lower than 50 percent, the
gravity of the risk mandates corrective measures. This moral imperative is illustrated by the following hypothetical situation in a
more limited context. Suppose the responsible ground official has
good reason to believe and does in fact believe that if he allows Flight
432 to proceed today as scheduled there is a one-in-twenty chance
that the plane will fall to the ground, killing the crew and the passengers. Suppose further that the officer decides to disregard this
substantial risk and allows the flight to proceed. If the feared risk
materializes into tragedy, society is faced with the question of what
to do with someone who consciously disregarded a 5 percent risk of
his causing the death of others. Assuming there was no need for the
flight to take place as scheduled, the officer would almost certainly
28. For evidence that with today's 4.3 billion human population, "human needs have begun
to outstrip the productive capacity of many local biological systems as currently managed,"
see L. BROWN, RESOURCE TRENDS 6-17 (1979) (quoted language at 7). Furthermore, "even six
billion people would be excessive for some key resources. . .. Adequately supporting even
[that number] will not be possible without greatly improved management of biological systems,
widespread rationing, stringent energy conservation measures, recycling programs, and a
more equitable distribution of vital resources such as food, land, and petroleum." Id. at 39.
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be prosecuted for negligence, or manslaughter, and perhaps ought to
be prosecuted even for murder. This conclusion would apply even if
the unjustified 5 percent risk of death had threatened and then killed
only one person. 29 The question, therefore, is simply what probability of risk is low enough to be noncriminal when the risk involves
millions or billions of human beings or even the very survival of the
human species? Unless we abolish the concept of human worth,
mankind cannot morally justify taking the ecological risks involved
in any more lax a population policy than that of earnestly seeking
overall fertility rates of no more than population replacement in
every nation currently above replacement fertility. The only limitation on this urgency is that such rates be achieved as soon as can
occur humanely. Indeed, as will be explained below, for some future
interim even replacement fertility is apt not to be a low enough fertility ceiling for economically distressed nations currently experiencing rapid population growth.
Even those nations which in relation to their human population
seemingly have an abundance of forest, fertile land, and other
resources should adhere to the replacement fertility ceiling. This is
true for at least three reasons. First, there is the extreme
unlikelihood of gaining an international consensus as to which nations could prolong their higher-than-replacement fertility rates
without substantial ecological or economic risk. Second, one seriously doubts that there are nations today who truly need a larger
popUlation. Finally, the population crisis is fundamentally a global
crisis. Humanity qua humanity is in grave danger of creating a
future in which the total number of human beings is far greater than
the world's ecological, economic, and political resources can service
29. I do, however, agree with Professors LaFave and Scott that "it would be nice, but not
possible, to create a table of homicidal risk for purposes of distinguishing among homicidal
crimes along some such lines as these:
Below 1% chance of death-no homicide crime
1% to 5% chance of death-manslaughter
Over 5% chance of death-murder.
W.R. LAFAVE &A.W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 543 n.6 (1972). I also concur in
their use and interpretation of the following nonfictional example:
When defendant fired two bullets into the caboose of a passing train, thereby killing a
brakeman, the chances were doubtless much greater that he would not kill than that
he would kill. Perhaps the chances of killing were no more than 5%, taking into account the area of the side of the caboose in relationship to the space taken up by the
vital parts of its occupants. In view of the lack of social utility in shooting into the side
of the caboose, the risk of 5% was held enough for murder in that case. Banks v.
State, 85 Tex. Crim, 165,211 S.W. 217 (1919).
[d. at 543.

866

ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS

[Vol. 10:853

on even a minimally adequate basis. If there are nations who still
have "too much" forest, fertile land, or other resources and still have
"too few" people, under present conditions minimal moral duty to
humanity requires that any such nation include itself within the nogreater-than-replacement-fertility imperative. 80
There is one arguable exception to the foregoing conclusion. This
exception involves the nation that experiences some sort of massive
tragedy or a series of tragedies yielding a drastic decrease in its
population. If the decrease clearly was not caused by that nation's
prior population growth, temporarily above-replacement fertility
would be justified in order to offset the population loss to the extent
that the regrowth in population would be compatible with economic
sufficiency and ecological abundance.
A global commitment to replacement fertility as a maximum norm
for every nation is in no sense an extreme response to the population
crisis. As was implied in the quoted passage beginning this article,
due to very high birth rates of recent decades many nations have record numbers of persons both at or below childbearing age. Because
of this demographic momentum, even if the population of every nation immediately could limit its reproduction to an approximate
replacement rate, the world's population would continue to increase
markedly-albeit less markedly than today-for several decades; it
would not reach actual zero population growth until about seventy
years had passed and world population had risen to above six billion
persons. 81 On the other hand, there appears to be an attainable goal
which will require international aid and cooperation so that all the
above-replacement-rate developing nations can gradually reduce
their fertility rates to replacement over the next ten years. If this oc-

30. But what if nation X fears that its adherence to replacement or temporarily subreplacement fertility eventually could make it vulnerable to aggression from larger or still growing
nation Y? Actually, although the growth of modern weaponry has not made population size an
irrelevant factor in a nation's military strength, it has, for better and for worse made it much
less a critical factor than used to be the case. Nevertheless, if real or imaginary national
defense fears should prove to be any impediment at all to reaching an adequate international
ZPG consensus, those nations favoring the replacement fertility ceiling and/or any stricter
temporary ceiling should forge a common defense alliance. The goal of the alliance should be to
guarantee every participating member sufficient military support from the other members to
repel aggression against it from any quarter outside or inside the membership. Obviously. the
alliance should remain perpetually open to new converts.
31. The projection just stated in the text is my rough adaptation of one made by
demographer Tomas Frejka in 1973, based on the (also illusory) worldwide attainment of
replacement fertility in 1975. See T. FREJKA, FUTURE POPULATION GROWTH, THE POPULATION
COUNCIL CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES WORKING PAPERS at 15-16,19,22 (May 1977).
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curs, the aggregate population of these nations will come fairly close
to doubling before ZPG is actually achieved some time around
2060. 32 Even in this situation, world population would be approximately eight billion persons. 33 India, for example, would have to
cope somehow with an eventual population of over one billion as compared with today's 700 million. Bangladesh, struggling desperately
to feed its present 95 million, would become a nation of well over 150
million. 34 Indeed, because they are now growing faster than India,
most Mrican nations and a large number of Latin American and
Asian nations would experience higher percentage increases in
population than would India. 35
In the context of serious ecological risk and the already vast
dimensions of global poverty at the level of real human need, such
projections make the following question unavoidable. Is replacement
fertility an adequate goal of fertility reduction? Here knowledge
eludes us. Due to the gravity of the global ecological crisis and the
immensity of existing human deprivation, one must believe that it
would be highly desirable for all nations to seek to achieve or continue fertility rates at least modestly below replacement level on a
temporary basis. Beyond that, it is very likely that at least some nations with currently high birth rates will to some extent repeat
China's decision to seek a temporary rate of fertility substantially
below replacement. 36 They will see that despite generous economic
32. This statement is the result both of my very rough adaptation of another Frejka
hypothetical projection which had imagined reduction of fertility to replacement in the
developing countries by the year 2000, see T. FREJKA supra note 31 at 19, and of the accepted
rule of thumb that a nation's population growing at 3% per year will still eventually double
despite reduction to replacement fertility over a ten-year period, see Gardner, supra note **.
The developing nations' population, exclusive of China, is growing at about 2.4% per year.
1983 DATA SHEET, supra note 1.
33. One writer projected the world's ultimate population at about 8.5 billion if worldwide
fertility were to drop to replacement levels by 1990. See Cherfas, The World Fertility Survey
Conference: Population Bomb Revisited, I SCIENCE 80 11, 18 (Nov. 1980). My rough interpolation of Frejka's projections would yield a figure somewhere between 7 and 8 billion.
34. The World Bank has estimated that reduction to replacement fertility by the year 2000
(about eight years later than my suggested goal) would give India an ultimate stationery
population of 1.375 billion and Bangladesh 215 million; that reduction to replacement fertility
by the year 2020 would give India an ultimate stationery population of 1.7 billion and
Bangladesh 290 million. R.S. McNAMARA, ADDRESS TO THE WORLD BANK BOARD OF GoVERNORS
10-11 (1979). My own "guess-estimates" are but rough interpolations from the bank's
awesome projections.
35. For a recent listing of current popUlation growth rates by nation, see generally 1983
DATA SHEET, supra note 1.
36. Concerning China's attempt, see Let Only Two Children Bloom, Science and the Citizen,
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN CCXVII (No.4, Apr. 1980); China's one-child rule halves growth rate,
London Times, Oct. 28, 1982, at 6, col. 3.
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development assistance their resources cannot be expected to support the substantial population increases that will occur even after
their early attainment of replacement fertility. For such nations, fertility rates moderately below replacement-say, fertility of about 1.5
children per woman-will become a temporary necessity. Where
there are already signs of severe regional stress, population surging
nations would be extremely wise to decide soon to seek moderately
below-replacement fertility rates on a gradual temporary basis.
Even if they succeed in reaching that temporary goal by the year
2000, they would still experience very considerable increases in population for quite some time. 87
The decision to seek temporary, at least moderately subreplacement fertility rates is apt to be an extremely controversial one in any
nation that decides to do so. In pursuing the one-child family goal,
the Beijing government in China is taking real political and moral
risks, including the risk that it may be resorting to or may resort to
excessive means. 88 One suspects, however, that the Chinese government would not be promoting the one-child family without being totally convinced that such a policy was a prerequisite for China's
economic survival and minimal well-being.
It is important that the justifiably controversial question of
whether to pursue a sUbreplacement fertility policy not cast doubt on
what should not be controversial: humankind must achieve fertility
rates no higher than replacement and must do so as soon as is possible humanely. 89

37. Fearing that accomplishment of the replacement fertility goal may not be an adequate
response to the population and resources crises, Worldwatch Institute's Lester Brown has proposed that the developed nations seek actual ZPG by 1985 and that the developing nations
reduce birth rates to 25 per thousand by 1985 and then achieve ZPG by about 2015. The
resulting stabilized world population would be slightly less than 6 billion persons. See L.
BROWN, RESOURCE TRENDS 37-50 (1979). In his later book Brown stretches out his proposed
ZPG timetable, asking the industrial nations to reach ZPG by 2000 and asking the developing
nations to do so by about 2020. See L. BROWN, BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE SocIETY 144-51
(1981).

38. See China's New Birth Policy: One BaJrg Is Enough, SCIENCE CCVI, at 429 (Oct. 26,
1979).
39. Among the strategies that a nation might use to achieve the no-higher-than-replacement
or some other lower fertility goal are population education, family planning services, and
economic incentives and disincentives. Unless individual reproductive freedom were to be
reduced to absolute zero (which is almost as unlikely as it would be undesirable), even after the
desired decline of fertility a nation's overall fertility rate would almost surely fluctuate to
some degree from time to time. Because some of those fluctuations are apt to yield temporary
"above ceiling" fertility rates, an obvious question of interpretation arises with respect to the
idea of a societal "fertility ceiling," whether that ceiling is set at replacement or at any other
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The following would likely constitute a reasonable set of goals.
Within the next year or two all developed nations with fertility rates
currently above replacement should achieve, and they and all other
developed nations should thereafter not significantly exceed, the
replacement fertility ceiling. With the help of SUbstantially increased
international family planning aid where needed, all developing nations should do likewise approximately by 1992. 40 Nations whose
popUlation growth, even with replacement fertility and generous
economic aid, is expected to exceed their resources' probable carrying capacity should then move gradually to a temporary fertility rate
of about 1.5, reaching this latter goal by about 2000 to 2005.
If the above goals were to be met, the resulting stabilized world
population, actual ZPG, likely would fall somewhere between six and
seven billion persons, with almost all of the population increase occurring in the developing nations. 41 Under this scenario, there would
fertility rate: What if a nation experiences one or more years of below ceiling fertility rates but
then its fertility swings upward to an above ceiling figure? So long as this subsequent above
ceiling situation didn't do more than offset the population effects of the nation's earlier below
ceiling rates, should the later situation be viewed as being in compliance with the fertility ceiling? Obviously, a point eventually could be reached where the answer would have to be "yes."
Were a nation's fertility to continue fluctuating only or primarily in the below replacement
ranges, the nation would eventually need to do what a few industrial nations have already
done: seek a temporarily above replacement fertility rate-perhaps the happiest political and
social task imaginable-in order to prevent an excessive decline in population. For the overwhelming majority of nations, however, at any plausibly expectable below replacement rate
the foregoing possible but highly unlikely need would be centuries away. Absent the massive
mortality we all must strive to avoid, and contrary to the almost surely exaggerated "national
disappearance fears" of a few governments in nations presently at or below their replacement rate, a shortage of people is simply not the likely problem anytime in the relevant future.
Nor would any expected below-replacement fertility rates cause any nation anything
near the age distribution difficulties caused us in the United States by the post-World-War II
baby boom. Accordingly, at least with respect to replacement as a nation's fertility ceiling, one
must say that in view of the ecological burden and risk of servicing even a "mere" five, six, or
seven billion human population, for the foreseeable future it would be extremely desirable if
even in the case of a nation whose fertility rate had fallen below its replacement rate, that nation would regard any return of its fertility rate to above replacement as an occasion meriting
appropriate efforts toward a reduction back to replacement as soon as humanely possible. This
approach would reduce the global ecological burden and risk, and it would increase the wellbeing of all peoples involved.
40. There is neither magic nor precision in the proposed difference in target dates between
the developed and the developing nations. Some difference appears necessary and justified for
at least two reasons. First, those developed nations not already at or below replacement fertility generally are not far above it, while most of the developing nations are currently well above
replacement. Second, the developed nations generally have extensive, highly developed health
care systems in which the full array of family planning services either already exists or can be
implemented quickly.
41. The resulting world population total would, of course, be affected by the number and
size of nations who experienced temporary sUbreplacement fertility rates, by the amount of
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be a substantial deceleration of humanity's present rate of population growth prior to the realization of actual ZPG. 42 In contrast, the
six to seven billion population level would be reached substantially
earlier as a prelude to much higher levels if present fertility rates
continue or slightly decrease and an early massive catastrophe is
avoided. The chances of humanity's having adequate preparation
time to service the needs of all its future members and to do so in
ways that won't demolish or damage the planet's life sustaining
vitality would, thus, be vastly improved if the ZPG timetable recommended above were to be accomplished.
B. Goal Assessment Continued

The potential harm even from humanity's rather modest delay
past 1992 in complying with the replacement fertility ceiling is staggering to imagine in two respects, both of which threaten massive
occurrences of premature death and disease. The first respect consists of the resulting steeper numerical increases in human need that
will tax the planet's economic and ecological resources in the decades
immediately ahead. The second is the necessarily heavier long-term
ecological burden that (absent an earlier catastrophic mortality) the
resulting higher total human population would impose. Concerning
the latter consequence, consider this example. If the task of achieving a replacement fertility ceiling worldwide takes two decades instead of one, representing success by the year 2002 rather than by
the year 1992, approximately one billion human beings will be added
to the world's projected stabilized population outcome-an expected
total of about eight to nine billion rather than about seven to eight
billion persons. 43 Again, one must say, "absent massive catastrophe," the risks of which increase with population. Subject, of
course, to this all-too-plausible qualification, scenarios involving substantially greater delays would yield dramatically higher population

those rates, and by the duration of their occurrence. None of these variables can be predicted
with confidence presently.
42. The substantial slowing of the growth rate would occur because the fertility rates under
the proposed scenario are so much lower than the fertility rates generally prevailing in the
developing nations. For a recent listing of fertility rates by nation, see generally 1983 DATA
SHEET, supra note 1. The total fertility rate for all the developing nations, exclusive of China,
is estimated at 5.2 children per woman. [d.
43. The comparison stated is my gross interpolation from T. FREJKA, supra note 31, at 19 &
22. For consistency, neither of my projections here includes the effect of any possible later
subreplacement fertility, a variable whose presence can hardly be assumed with any confidence.
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outcomes. For example, the gradual achievement of worldwide replacement fertility over the next sixty years yields a projected world
population of over 15 billion. 44 Anyone who thinks that a difference
in human population of a "mere" one billion is anything other than
enormous in its potential ecological impact perhaps has forgotten
that the one billion figure was the world's approximate total human
population in 1820.
The careful reader is apt to notice my omission thus far of what
well may be the most likely array of risks in an overpopulated world:
increasingly intense and bitter social conflict; rampant violence and
political terrorism; international extortion; epidemics of minor or
local wars; and vastly increased chances of nuclear holocaust. I have
neglected these risks not because I am able to regard them as unlikely, but because I am convinced that even without them, taking the
ecological risks of continued above-replacement fertility rates for
any unnecessary duration is itself a morally indefensible policy.
When, in addition, we envision the outcomes just enumerated, all of
whose probabilities multiply as world population moves higher and
higher, we must conclude that any reasonably avoidable continuation
of above-replacement fertility rates by the world's nations would be
indescribably evil and insane.
There is at least one more illusory intellectual escape from this
judgment. It is the supermoral notion that were all humankind
religiously to commit itself to a truly saintly degree of economic
asceticism, forswearing all the unnecessary gifts of industrial
technology, we could postpone the need to worry about population
limits for a long time, perhaps even indefinitely. My response is as
follows. It is often the case that a proposer of public policy is ethically
required to include in his or her proposals a nontrivial amount of
citizens' altruistic or enlightened self-denial. Conditions well may require proposing a degree of self-denial that seems politically
unrealistic. But to advocate any public policy on an assumption of
man's achieving a degree of unselfishness far beyond what could be
hoped for plausibly under even the most effective and inspiring
political-educational-moralleadership is itself reckless. In short, the
overwhelming majority of human beings are not about to be persuaded to forswear all or nearly all the non-necessity benefits of
technology and affluence. This is most certainly true in the affluent
nations; we are much too irrevocably addicted. Likewise, the
44. See id.
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developing nations have received a glimpse of the secular Promised
Land of Plenty which is too enticing to settle for an ascetic
wilderness. If anything, these added realities require that the
chances of ecological disaster from continuing anything like present
population growth be revised upwards from that suggested earlier.
This is not meant to imply that the world's presently affluent
peoples won't be called upon to give up a substantial portion of their
environmentally burdensome affluence. Nor is it meant to imply that
the developing nations will not have to practice environmental and
ecological care in pursuing their economic goals. Put simply, neither
the affluent nations nor the developing nations can be expected to
show enough economic restraint to make sustained commitment to
fertility rates no higher than replacement (and in some cases, temporarily subreplacement rates) an unnecessary or deferrable policy
for either group. Otherwise, in the affluent nations substantially increasing population would seriously undercut or vitiate reductions
achieved in per capita energy use, resource depletion, and pollution.
In the developing nations, where substantial economic growth is
needed just to provide everyone with basic necessities, soaring
population would increase enormously the aggregate ecological
harm resulting from increased per capita GNP. If humanity ignores
the need for fertility limits and devotes itself to a quixotic attack
upon material consumption alone, its quest for sustainable well-being
is almost surely doomed to failure.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In order to regard the existing world population growth outlook
with anything other than extreme alarm, we must believe that technology and/or luck and/or prayer46 can and very likely will supply
every single physical resource required to sustain the life and the
physical health of both: (a) a rapidly increasing human population in
the decades ahead; and (b) a vastly increased human population in
the indefinite future thereafter. Furthermore, we must believe that
the consumptive economic activities of an enormously increased
humankind can be limited (without worldwide subjection to tyranny)
to an extent sufficient to preserve the planet's continued capacity to
support massively large numbers of people. Finally, we must believe

45. But I believe I recall being told that tempting the Lord thy God is a grievous sin. An example would be intentionally jumping from a 20-story window and praying for deliverance en
route.
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that in a future world where most or all natural beauty would by then
surely have been destroyed in trying to meet the enormously increased sum of human want and need, the probable outcome will be
this: an immensely larger and far more crowded human race, blessed
with an enlarged and more widely dispersed supply of governmental
and private weapons of massive and individualized violence, can and
will struggle peaceably to meet its needs and, thriving in the best of
mental health, compete peaceably for affluence and for other scarce
values.
It is, of course, possible that all the foregoing required beliefs, if
daringly given the chance, might come true. But ethics, a basic
respect for life, prohibits humanity from taking so awesome a set of
risks when there is no necessity for doing so. The stakes in human
life are simply too high; the risks are simply too substantial. If the
technological superoptimists and the ecological superoptimists
aren't misleading us tragically concerning the consequences of continued above-replacement fertility, there is a very substantial probability that the moral superoptimists are.

